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Abstract 
 
 
This paper is an attempt to make a contribution to current debates about the reform of higher 
education by using the work of Ronald Coase on `the nature of the firm' as a framework for 
considering alternative institutional structures for delivering educational services.  Attention is 
focused particularly on rival ways of coordinating the delivery of educational services and 
guaranteeing standards.  Extreme market-based scenarios involving freelance academics and 
itemised billing for specific services are contrasted with the present system involving very 
incomplete contracts for academic employees and `banquet-style' purchases of degrees by 
students.  Costs and benefits of different institutional structures are examined.  The role of 
academic professionalism in limiting opportunistic behaviour is considered in relation to  
policies that involve an increase in auditing of tertiary institutions. 
 
Keywords: accreditation, economic coordination, education policy, franchising,  
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* Peter E Earl, Professor of Economics, Department of Economics and Marketing, 
Lincoln University. 
 
 Inaugural Lecture, 24 May 1994, Lincoln University 
 
 With Electronic Mail Discussants Bill Rosenberg and Stan Godlovitch 
3 
 
 
 
Contents 
 
 
List of Tables (i) 
 
List of Figures (i) 
 
 
1. Introduction 1 
 
2. The Significance of Contractual Incompleteness 2 
 
3.  A Decentralised, User-pays Market-based Scenario 5 
 
4. Quality Assurance in Educational Markets 8 
 
5. Banquet versus à la carte Educational Services? 10 
 
6. Advantages and Problems of a Market-based System 13 
 
 6.1 Advantages 13 
 
  6.1.1 Advantage 1:  improved utilisation of 
   physical resources 13 
  6.1.2 Advantage 2:  a heightened concentration 
   on servicing clients 15 
  6.1.3 Advantage 3:  more efficient use of human  
   resources 16 
  6.1.4 Advantage 4:  greater choice of work lifestyle 18 
 
 6.2 Disadvantages 19 
 
  6.2.1 Possible disadvantage 1:  academics may spend a 
   considerable amount of time negotiating contracts 19 
  6.2.2 Possible disadvantage 2:  it might be too difficult 
   (or easy) for deviant academics to gain accreditation 19 
  6.2.3 Possible disadvantage 3:  short-term contracts may 
   bias the direction of research 20 
  6.2.4 Possible disadvantage 4:  students may not see merit 
   in spending more than the bare minimum on their studies 20 
  6.2.5 Possible disadvantage 5:  the range of options 
   available to students may decline 21 
  6.2.6 Possible disadvantage 6:  a loss of equity for students 21 
  6.2.7 Possible disadvantage 7:  loss of `atmosphere' 22 
 
7. Conclusion  23 
 
References 26 
 
Discussion 27 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 List of Tables 
 
 
1The A to Z of Being a Self-Employed Academic in a 
 Decentralised Tertiary Education System 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 List of Figures 
 
 
1 Decentralised Funding, Coordination and Delivery 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (i) 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to explore whether universities as we nowadays take them for granted 
are necessarily the most appropriate institutions for delivering efficiently the kinds of products 
that their customers and/or society at large wish for them to provide.  My focus here arises 
partly because of my reflections on the changes that have been taking place in the tertiary 
education sector over the past decade.  These include: 
 
 (i) well publicised central audits of research and audits of teaching performance by 
visiting panels of academics (for example, in the United Kingdom), with subsequent 
allocations of funds being made dependent on the results of these audits; 
 (ii) mergers of institutions and the emergence of autonomous `new universities' from 
former university colleges and polytechnics; 
 (iii) the growth of private universities; 
  (iv) articulation agreements between universities and other institutions and the advocacy, 
particularly in New Zealand, of `seamless' education systems in which students might 
begin tertiary studies at school and subsequently take course credits with them as they 
moved on to and/or between polytechnics and universities without having to surmount 
bureaucratic hurdles; 
   (v) increasingly open rights to tender for research funds, which have left university staff in 
some countries competing with private individuals and private research institutes or 
other government agencies; 
  (vi) the rise of new information technologies such as email and CD-ROM storage systems; 
 (vii) the erosion of academic tenure and increasing talk of privatisation, corporatisation and 
user charges.   
 
My interest in the delivery of tertiary education is also due partly to an impression I believe I 
have in common with many academics, namely that universities are prone to be highly 
politicised, bureaucratic leviathans that are slow moving and difficult to change, where there are 
quite major differences in performance associated with any level of remuneration.  Finally, my 
interest in this topic has grown out of much of the work in industrial economics that I have 
undertaken over the past five years, based around the so-called `New Institutional Economics' 
that has belatedly grown out of a pioneering 1937 article by Ronald Coase, winner of the 1991 
Nobel Prize in Economics.  Here, I apply Coase's thinking to the `education industry'. 
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2. The Significance of Contractual Incompleteness 
 
Coase asked and attempted to answer a fundamental question: what is the nature of a firm? As 
befits someone who was subsequently to play a central role in developing links between 
economics and law, Coase saw the essence of firms not in terms of physical structures such as 
factories, machines and offices but in terms of a distinctive contractual system for getting things 
done.  In his view, the firm appears more like a miniature command economy with voluntary 
membership, than as a market-based way of organising economic activity.  A market contract is 
typically for something quite specific, such as an economy class seat on the 12.15 Air New 
Zealand flight from Christchurch to Wellington on 26 May 1994, or for a taxi from Christchurch 
airport taxi rank to Lincoln University right now.  Some contracts are very specific indeed, 
containing all sorts of contingent clauses (X will be undertaken if and only if Y happens) and 
very precise details concerning the quality of what will be supplied and penalty payments that 
will be due if it is not supplied (Kay, 1993, gives a thorough and readable overview of the 
variety of contracts involved in business activities).  By contrast, the contracts that bring 
employees and shareholders together in a firm are very loosely specified in comparison to the 
roles that they involve.  Shareholders have some well-defined rights but these stop short of any 
right to a particular stream of dividends.  Employees may be hired in particular roles within a 
management hierarchy and with some specification of the terms by which satisfactory 
performance may be judged and conditions under which the contract may be terminated, but 
their employment contracts will give them very little guidance about what they will be doing at 
any particular point of time during their association with the firm.  They do what they 
themselves decide to do, in the light of their assessments of the work environment and directives 
issued by their bosses from time to time. 
 
An academic's employment contract epitomises Coase's notion of an incompletely specified 
contract.  My own one, for example, formally runs for eight pages plus a covering letter from 
the Personnel Registrar, but it seems to reduce to barely five lines: 
 
The successful applicant will be expected to serve terms as Head of Department.  The Professor 
of Economics will be responsible either directly or through the Head of Department to 
the Vice-Chancellor for teaching and supervision of courses in Economics at graduate, 
undergraduate and diploma level.  He/she will be expected to initiate and develop 
research in the field of economics and to participate in the University's extension and 
consulting activities. 
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This is very vague indeed, as far as saying when I will do which tasks, or in 
defining terms.  Does an inaugural lecture come under the heading of `extension' 
activities, for example, and would I have run into trouble with the University 
had I refused to accept the role of supervisor for the two Masters dissertations in 
Marketing that I am overseeing, given that the contract refers only to 
Economics?  A substantial part of many employment contracts is implicit: both 
parties have overlapping expectations about reasonable demands that are not 
written down (everyone knows that new professors do inaugural lectures, don't 
they?).  If expectations are somewhat divergent the relationship between 
employer and employee nonetheless often lasts for considerable periods, not 
through formal contract renegotiation but instead on the basis of give and take, 
until either party decides they have had enough and can make superior 
alternative arrangements. 
 
Vague contracts are potentially open to what Williamson (1975, 1985) has called opportunistic 
behaviour: guileful, self-serving action based on the exploitation of some kind of information 
advantage.  For example, a head of department cannot be monitoring all his/her staff 
simultaneously and hence staff may be able to get away with doing less for their employers than 
they would be prepared to do if their efforts could easily be monitored:  a lecturer might claim to 
be at home marking assignments if not present at the university, but he or she might actually be 
spending time running a consulting operation or personal farm.  Vague employment contracts 
also tend to be associated with expenditure on managers, who themselves will have vague 
contractual ties to their employers.  They are needed not merely to extract a fair day's work for a 
fair day's pay but also because, without a team of managers to coordinate activities and give out 
directions, a group of employees could end up pulling in conflicting directions if they each tried 
independently to decide what to do when they encountered events that were not specified in 
their contracts. 
 
Coase argued that such costs of contractual incompleteness are only willingly incurred by 
employers/entrepreneurs in order to avoid, at the margin, even more significant costs associated 
with getting things done by more specific contracts.  To design contracts that cover a long 
period of time is a very costly business if one is dealing with a world of change and wants to 
make sure the contract is not rendered invalid by  a significant event that was not built into the 
contract.  A highly detailed contract may cover the contingencies that arise, with no need to have 
a team of managers to work out what to do, but there may be a surprise because something 
hitherto unimagined occurs, or there may be ambiguity about what has 
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occurred.  Either way, there is likely to be an awful lot of redundancy in the contract, for many 
things that the parties worry about will never occur.  Contracts can be simplified by making 
them very short-term, but then the parties will be forever coming back to the negotiating table to 
work out terms and conditions for new tasks.  The beauty of Coasian employment contracts is 
that they involve relatively low set-up costs, since they lack fine print, and they can be in place 
for a long period.  What Coase might have added was that, when employers leave output 
requirements rather vague, employees may actually do a lot more for a given remuneration than 
they would if they were only obliged to deliver a particular amount: for academics on probation 
it is never very clear what the minimum requirements for tenure are, so there will be hesitancy 
about saying `No' if senior staff keep putting more tasks on their desks. 
 
Coase sums up the firm as a device for superseding the market mechanism and avoiding the 
costs that go with using markets to get things done.  Once an entrepreneur has decided which 
sorts of product to be involved in making, the key strategic task then becomes deciding on 
which activities should be internalised-brought within corporate boundaries to be undertaken by 
employees-and which should be commissioned from subcontractors.  For example, should a 
university employ computing staff to deal with hardware and software problems, or should it 
call in outside firms that specialise in handling computing difficulties, as and when the need 
arises? Between internalisation and subcontracting there lies the fuzzy world of relational 
contracting: developing goodwill relationships and implicit long-term contracts with outside 
contractors, even though the later are formally only hired on the spot.  Such trading relationships 
encourage the subcontractors to make investments that help them deliver a better service for 
their customers: for example, part-time tutors hired on an hourly basis may tool up with 
course-specific knowledge if they are given reason to believe they will get called upon 
regularly, just as lecturers will make similar investments on an understanding, nowhere written 
down, that they will get to teach the course for several years in a row. 
 
With the recognition of phenomena such as relational contracting, the boundaries and defining 
features of firms have become fuzzier to economists in recent years as Coase's ideas have been 
extended.  But with this fuzziness has also come an increasing tendency to analyse economic 
organisation in terms of alternative contractual systems, to ask `would it not make sense to 
arrange things differently?'.  Let us now go through just such a comparative institutional 
analysis of methods for delivering tertiary-level education. 
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3. A Decentralised, User-pays Market-Based Scenario 
 
The degree and diploma industry is largely the preserve of state-owned, budget based 
institutions rather than privately owned profit seeking firms.  It shows how much can be 
achieved on the basis of very vague contracts and relational contracting, rather than through 
legalistic specification of tasks in fine print.  Academics carve out their niches not merely within 
the universities that employ them but also as members of professional networks where implicit 
contracts and a concern with goodwill are much in evidence: for example, much refereeing and 
journal management is done on an unpaid basis or for nominal fees that in no way reflect the 
opportunity costs of time foregone from activities such as consulting.  However, it is quite easy 
to imagine tertiary-level teaching and research activities being arranged without any 
involvement of institutions like present-day universities.  
 
In a fully decentralised, user-pays market-based delivery system, customers-students and 
research clients-would make contracts with self-employed academics just as some students hire 
private tutors and individuals or organisations purchase professional services from lawyers, 
dentists or management consultants.  Some education services might also be sold by firms 
whose primary business activities involved the delivery of related services (why not even study 
accountancy with an accountancy firm?).  If self-employment arrangements are common with 
other `professions',  it is not obvious why academia is not built around them too, particularly 
given the common view that academics are people who tend to avoid working in the private 
sector or public service because they want to be their own bosses with control over how they 
spend their time.  The net earnings of freelance academics would be derived in the manner set 
out in Table 1. 
 
The picture here is perhaps best understood via a parallel with how musicians assemble a living 
from teaching, performing with orchestral groups, session work and so on.  Students might not 
emerge with degrees after studying with particular suppliers of educational services (though I 
will consider this possibility shortly). Instead, they would be able to report to potential 
employers that they had, say, studied behavioural economics with Peter Earl, just as a freelance 
classical guitarist might be able to report studying with John Williams.  A market based delivery 
system by no means precludes continuation of professional work and activities that do not 
involve fees, such as less prestigious journals continuing not to demand submission fees so long 
as they could find academics prepared to spend their time refereeing 
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for no fee (possibly because these academics were interested in fostering non-mainstream work 
or the kind of research that would lead their own ideas to become more widely known). 
 
 Table 1 
 The A to Z of Being a Self-Employed Academic in a  
 Decentralised Tertiary Education System 
  
Income 
 A Fees from students taking one's own subject units 
 B Earnings as a subcontractor to other academics' subject units 
 C Fees as a student advisor or personal tutor 
 D Earnings as an external examiner 
 E Earnings as a referee 
 F Earnings as a research consultant 
 G Earnings as an educational consultant (e.g. as a mentor to peers or for services to 
an accreditation body) 
 H Research grants received 
 I Income from article photocopy/CD-ROM usage royalties and lending rights 
 J Royalty income 
 
  Less 
Expenses 
 K Rental of lecture rooms, teaching laboratories and tutorial rooms 
 L Rental of office space 
 M Secretarial fees and computing assistance 
 N Payments to subject subcontractors (e.g. tutors, demonstrators) 
 O Payments to external examiners of one's subject units 
 P Payments for educational consulting (e.g. mentoring services, advice on teaching 
and subject design) 
 Q Accreditation fees and membership of professional bodies 
 R Promotion expenses 
 S Payments to research assistants 
 T Rental of computing equipment and laboratory space and equipment 
 U Purchase of data, books and journals 
 V Library fees 
 W Communication costs (fax, post, telephone, email) 
 X Printing and stationery 
 Y Depreciation and maintenance of own computing equipment; purchase of 
software 
 Z Submission fees to journals 
 AA Accountant's fee 
 
 
The student fees that academics received under such a system could come from government 
vouchers given to tertiary students and/or from self-funded students: a user-pays delivery 
system is entirely compatible with a continuing government involvement in funding tertiary 
studies.  Decisions about the level of funding per student would affect academic incomes 
somewhat indirectly, depending on the number of academics willing to contest the market  
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for students in particular disciplinary areas.  Students would have to decide for themselves how  
to budget their finances between different academics' offerings: they might opt for relatively poorly 
rated but cheap units in some areas of study in order to invest more to study other subjects with 
renowned scholars.  Academics would thus have to compete with each other for business, just as 
they do within present university systems.  However, the payoffs to competitive success would 
accrue directly to individual academics rather than, as at present, taking the form of greater staffing 
allocations to the departments of which they are members.  It would be up to individual academics 
how to price the subjects that they offered and the terms under which they would accept students: 
those who were in high demand might opt to run large classes and subcontract tutorial work, or 
they might opt to limit admission to particular kinds of students.  Decisions here would probably 
depend on the standards they wished to set with a view to the long-run generation of their 
reputations as teachers.  Some of those who could command high fees as teachers might opt to 
teach fewer hours in order to spend time on developing teaching materials (texts, study guides and 
so on) based on their expertise and from which they might earn additional incomes; others might 
choose to spend more time on unfunded research or in chasing research funds. 
 
There is no inherent need for a nesting together of tertiary teaching activities to be accommodated 
in a set of buildings owned by a single institution known as a university.  Just as it would be 
possible for universities around the world to sell off their physical assets to property companies and 
then pay fees for using them, so it would be possible for freelance academics to rent the 
infrastructure facilities that they needed to run the subject units they were selling to student clients.  
The situation would be very much analogous with that of, say, a psychologist who opts to go in 
into private practice and rents office space and secretarial services for normal consulting activities 
and who occasionally puts on seminars for fellow practitioners in hotel conference facilities rented 
out specially for the occasion.  There might, of course, be marketing advantages from being located 
near to fellow academics offering both competitive and complementary subject units.  If so, 
suppliers of office and lecture spaces in particularly sought after locations would be expected to 
ration their scarce resources by charging premium rentals.  It is possible also that teams of 
academics, like private health professionals and lawyers, might actually form partnership 
arrangements and invest in their own work accommodation if they felt there were advantages 
compared with renting.  However, difficulties in arranging for prompt exits from partnerships 
would tend to militate against joint ownership of academic premises by those academics who were 
not confident of being able to generate a steady stream of earnings to support their practices. 
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4. Quality Assurance in Educational Markets 
 
I think it is necessary, before I consider the pros and cons of a delivery system based around 
freelance academics, to devote careful attention to the nature of what is being delivered and 
alternative ways in which the educational services might be packaged for students.  At the outset 
it should be noted that, under present arrangements, university students are buyers of a product 
whose nature is incompletely specified.  This is not a simple, one-off impersonal transaction like 
the purchase of a taxi ride; rather, students have a contractual relationship with universities that 
has much in common with an employment contract.  Education is a product that cannot be 
summed up in a fully specified contract, even though many modern textbooks try to delude 
students to the contrary with promises that `By the end of this chapter you will be able to....'  For 
one thing, there is the paradox noted by Arrow (1962): insofar as a contract concerns the supply 
of information, the actual delivery of information becomes unnecessary if it is detailed in the 
contract.  Someone who had an unsigned copy of the contract would never need to sign it and 
pay for the information.  Another area of difficulty is that what students get out of the 
educational process will depend very much on what they put into it.  It will be very difficult to 
specify the intellectual capacities they will need to apply to make progress at a particular rate, 
and very difficult indeed to monitor the extent to which their progress is being hindered by their 
lack of effort rather than intellectual difficulties or poor quality teaching. 
 
Now, if academic incomes depend on maintaining a throughput of fee-paying students, and if 
the achievements of students can be affected by the intensity of teaching, then academics face a 
conflict of interest that would not exist if educational services could be delivered via fully 
specified contracts.  There is potential for them to succumb to the temptations to accept as 
students anyone who has the wherewithal to pay for tuition, and to award degrees to them after 
giving little by way of tuition services and expecting little in terms of effort and ability.  
Working against this temptation are, in addition to personal integrity, the difficulties they may 
expect to run into in the long run if people start to think that the degrees they award signify little 
about intellectual achievements.  Buyers of tertiary-level education need to be able to signal to 
potential employers that their education has reached a particular standard.  They also require a 
means of judging the quality of tuition they are likely to receive from  
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choosing a particular course of study.  In short, students do not want to hand over money only to 
find that they get little by way of services in return and that even if they contribute a lot 
themselves their qualifications are not taken seriously.  
 
Under present institutional arrangements, senior staff in universities can be seen as having a key 
role to play in guaranteeing standards of tuition and attainments.  They select teaching staff with 
reference to their qualifications and professional standing.  They oversee the introduction of new 
subjects.  They are in a position to audit teaching and examination processes.  They can attempt 
to demonstrate their students' levels of attainment by commissioning peer reviews of their 
processes, for example by appointing external examiners or by having their activities audited 
externally by teams whose members comprise senior staff from rival institutions.  University 
management teams have expertise for judging the quality of academic staff and relative 
performance, that students cannot hope to possess.  If universities vanished as legal entities and 
freelance academics began to deliver tertiary educational services, students would need new 
ways of judging the quality of tuition and of signalling the quality of their educational 
achievements. 
 
Many different kinds of quality guaranteeing devices could appear if tertiary education were 
market-based.  Indeed, Hodgson (1988, p. 174) goes so far as to suggest that a market can only 
really be said to exist as an arena for arranging transactions-as distinct from a set of bilateral 
exchanges-if institutions have developed to enable customers to make competent judgments 
about rival suppliers' offerings without investing inordinate amounts of time in examining 
suppliers' proposals and haggling with them.  Some entrepreneurs might get into the business of 
providing directories of good academics, just as Egon Ronay prepares good food guides, or the 
Automobile Association rates hotels and garages.  Even now, of course, students' associations 
offer their own ratings of staff within particular universities and directories of universities are 
published: universities are by no means functioning perfectly as agencies for guaranteeing and 
signalling academic quality.  Students and employers may not have heard of a particular 
academic who teaches or examines a subject, but this might not matter if the person were listed 
on the transcript as rated by an academic rating agency as a four-star lecturer on a scale of one to 
five in the area in question, and that the person's subject was rated as a 100-level, 200-level or 
whatever-level unit.  Indeed, such an agency might even offer a transcript preparation service 
for students whereby it collated and rated the results listed on certificates that freelance 
academics had awarded to them.  These transcripts would take the place of traditional degree 
certificates and transcripts. 
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Given the wide range of subjects that students might wish to study, the whole business (note the 
word, business) of rating academics would probably be a multi-level operation.  I might find 
myself wanting to pay, say, the New Zealand Society of Economics to consider my skills for 
accreditation at particular levels in particular areas and then pay, say, Moody's Directories to 
have my ratings entered into their publications.  I might also receive some fees as a consultant 
writing references for fellow economists seeking accreditation.  All this may seem rather odd to 
academics brought up under present institutional arrangements, but it is quite normal experience 
for, say, a clinical psychologist, who may find it difficult, even in the absence of legal restraints, 
to earn a living without being accepted as a member of a professional association or as an 
accredited counsellor of a particular kind.  The same may be said for used car dealers, plumbers, 
international removalists, and so on: as Hodgson stresses, professional bodies are a key means 
by which suppliers of particular services signal the quality of their work. 
 
Franchise arrangements are an institutional device that we might see emerging as a half-way 
house between academic freelancing and traditional universities; indeed, they are already 
starting to appear even in the present university system and Douglas (1993, chapter 5) has 
argued a case for private schools using them as a device to expand their geographical coverage 
without using the boarding-school strategy.  (See Dnes, 1992, for a study of franchising from 
the standpoint of the new institutional economics.) Under this system, the franchiser typically 
invests in pioneering the teaching system, trains staff in its delivery, undertakes nationwide 
marketing of the product and acts as a monitor of quality; franchisees pay a fee for the right to 
offer the teaching programme along quite heavily specified lines within a particular territory.  A 
royalty per student would be paid to the franchiser to give an incentive to ensure that the 
educational product remained of a standard that kept attracting fee-paying students to study with 
the franchisee. 
 
5. Banquet versus à la carte Educational Services? 
 
When students enrol at a typical university, the tuition that they purchase comes as a package 
deal.  The only additional study-related bills they expect to incur are for textbooks, stationery, a 
personal computer, photocopying and printing.  Minor challenges to this philosophy have been 
going on for some time, with varying degrees of success.  For example, in the face of escalating 
departmental photocopying bills, it is sometimes suggested 
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that students might be expected to pay for extensive handouts of course materials.  This sort of 
suggestion is prone not to be implemented, however, due to worries about administrative costs 
and fears that students may protest about paying on the ground that this is one of the sort of 
things that their up-front lump sum fees are supposed to cover.  By contrast, universities have 
been willing to charge students to have their exam grades reconsidered-the charge is apparently 
there to discourage frivolous requests, but none of the revenue finds its way from Registry 
offices to the hapless academics who find their research time eaten up by requests to reconsider 
most of the C- or D grades that they dared to award.  In this section I intend to consider the 
economics of a much more radical 'unbundling' of the degree package. 
 
Modern information technology makes it possible for students to be billed on an itemised basis 
for the educational services that they consume.  It is already common for attendances at tutorials 
to be collected and then recorded on subject spreadsheets.  With on-line or full-text CD-ROM 
sourcing of journal articles being increasingly the path ahead, it is probably inevitable that 
libraries will start operating increasingly on a user-pays basis in order to ration their scarce 
supplies of information technology.  But we could go much further than this by issuing each 
student with an ID card with a personal bar code and installing bar code readers linked to 
individual academics' computers and, if felt necessary, from there to an agency that specialised 
in billing students on behalf of the academics.  Such equipment is already being advertised in 
the Times Higher Education Supplement, for monitoring examination attendance and library 
usage.  In technical terms it is but a short step to a world in which students are charged on a 
minute by minute basis for their use of the library and for the borrowings they make.  There 
would no longer be a need for photocopy cards of the kind we presently have, merely for bar 
code readers integrated with photocopiers, printers and other library information systems.  An 
extension of this technology would involve requiring students to have their bar codes scanned 
before lecture theatre turnstiles would let them in, and at the start and finish of each consultation 
in a lecturer's  
office. 
 
In a market-based educational system, some academics might find that they could make their 
services appeal to some students by delivering them in this unbundled sort of way, giving the 
students greater freedom of choice to invest their scarce funds in ways that seemed best to suit 
their needs.  Other students might prefer to forego opportunities for an à la carte kind 
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of education in favour of one based around a programme more like a banquet meal, that 
involved little scope for paying more for customised service.  Programmes might include 
particular sets of courses, with guaranteed admission to a particular number of lectures, tutorials 
and hours of office consultations, types of feedback on assignments and so on.  Such 
programmes might be assembled and marketed by entrepreneurs who specialised as educational 
wholesalers offering branded products that were easier for employers to judge than would be the 
kinds of educational transcripts produced by rating agencies.  Some wholesalers might organise 
activities in a franchise manner, whilst acting as a fee collection and student-forwarding agency 
for franchisees.  Others might subcontract a range of quite specific tasks to various freelance 
academics, as well as arranging rental of facilities for the academics to perform in, just as a rock 
concert promoter may arrange ticket sales, hire a set of venues, PA systems and artists, and the 
artists have simply to present their acts for a flat fee without having to spend time making all the 
necessary prior arrangements. 
 
The parallells between a wholesaler of tertiary-level study programmes and a promoter of 
concerts may be extended into the question of who bears the risks under alternative systems of 
organisation.  This is a major issue, for there is no guarantee that freelance academics will find 
enough demand for the services they wish to sell as a means towards earning a living.  Under 
the present system, the universities' balance sheets bear the immediate brunt of unexpectedly 
low enrolments; staff incomes are not reduced, though staff on short-term contracts may find 
that their employment is not rolled over into a new contract. Unexpectedly high enrolments are 
often a gain for the university and a burden for the staff whose teaching loads rise until 
additional staff are eventually hired but whose incomes do not adjust in line with increases with 
their teaching productivity.  University heads of departments allocate teaching duties to staff 
over a limited set of courses, so competition for numbers is between a few institutions who can 
keep an eye on each other's course offerings.  Academics in a freelance system of teaching 
would be prone to offer too many courses, in order to guarantee their incomes: if I don't have a 
local monopoly over offering second year microeconomics units, then I might also offer, say, a 
macroeconomics unit in case competitors offer microeconomics units, and likewise, a 
macroeconomics teacher, fearing competitive offerings, might hedge his or her bets by also 
offering a microeconomics unit.  To the extent the academics can credibly teach in a range of 
areas there is potential for poor coordination and unduly cut-throat competition (cf. Richardson, 
1960). 
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Uneconomic duplication of subject offerings could be reduced somewhat if academics moved 
from individual self-employment to cooperative ventures in which they offered a range of 
subjects but specialised in which ones they taught.  Academic wholesale operations could 
provide another means by which such coordination problems could be reduced to acceptable 
levels, a means which does not involve internalisation.  Wholesaler entrepreneurs could 
negotiate contracts with particular academics for block purchases of student places on their 
courses.  They would then seek to fill these places via a retail network of student advisers who, 
like travel agents, would book places for students once they had worked out their goals and 
capabilities.  The wholesalers would thus offer a guaranteed income for the self-employed 
academics but then take the initiative in pricing and marketing subject units and take any profits 
or losses as their rewards.  Permutations involving sharing risks may also be envisaged and 
might appeal more to some academics and would-be intermediaries. 
 
6. Advantages and Problems of a Market-based System 
 
The analysis so far presented may be easier to keep in mind with reference to Figure 1.  It is an 
analysis intended to show that, in principle, those who wish to receive a tertiary-level education 
do not have to deal with modern universities, typically large organisations employing hundreds 
or thousands of teaching staff with extensive investments in physical infrastructure.  It is easy to 
envisage the delivery of education being arranged instead in ways similar to those employed in 
professional and leisure services.  I now turn to consider some of the pros and cons of the kinds 
of contracting systems I have been outlining. 
 
6.1 Advantages 
    
6.1.1  Advantage 1:  improved utilisation of physical resources 
 
The combination of privatised physical assets and freelance academic providers of human assets 
sounds like a recipe for greatly reduced infrastructure costs.  The typical university at present 
makes little use of the potential for internal pricing systems to ensure that its physical resources 
are efficiently used.  Many lecturers' offices are empty for major parts of the working week 
whilst their supposed occupants are elsewhere teaching, researching or working at home.  If 
lecturers had to rent their own offices there would be a major incentive to devise space roster 
arrangements similar to those that private sector suppliers of other  
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professional services use by contracting from companies that sell serviced office space on an 
hourly or daily basis.  Problems with safeguarding property such as academic libraries and files 
might tend to make academics keep these resources at home, and in some countries they would 
be able to claim tax relief against the parts of their homes devoted to work activities.  
 
If academics had to pay for their own teaching facilities from their own teaching budgets, they 
would have an incentive to shop around in terms of both location and time of day for 
economical deals.  No longer would prime timetable slots and sought-after modern lecture 
theatres be made available very much at the whim of timetable committees with no use made of 
prices to ration scarce space; rather, suppliers and consumers of educational services would be 
encouraged to ask serious questions about what they were prepared to pay in order for subjects 
to be offered at particular times of day and in particular kinds of premises.  In the event that 
owners of teaching and office spaces did not offer deals as appealing as those available 
elsewhere, freelance academics could signal this by exiting - in contrast to the situation at 
present in some universities where lecturers can voice their objections to the way that resources 
are being allocated but often feel powerless to do very much in the face of an unresponsive 
bureaucracy (cf. Hirschman, 1970).  I would predict that in a decentralised system of provision 
of tertiary education much more teaching would be conducted outside of normal office hours, 
using space rented from schools and firms and that purpose-built accommodation would also 
have higher rates of occupancy.  Owners of school and business premises would be more 
inclined to have their facilities designed to capture the tertiary market, trading the costs of doing 
so against the cost of receiving no revenue during periods when they were not being used. 
 
6.1.2  Advantage 2:  a heightened concentration on servicing clients 
 
In general there would be more scope for academics to experiment with innovative subjects and 
teaching styles.  Academics with good reputations who wanted to pioneer subjects that 
threatened to steal numbers from colleagues' enrolments would no longer have to battle through 
departmental `retreats' and subsequent endless layers of faculty and university committees 
before being given approval and being allowed to teach their subjects.  Rather, they would pay 
to have their proposals rated for academic level by an accreditation body and entered in 
databases used by professional advisors of students; then they would be able freely to take their 
chances over whether they achieved any sales.  In order to stay in business, 
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accreditation agencies and academic database compilers would need to offer a service at least as 
good as potential suppliers of such services; as with international credit rating agencies such as 
Moody's Investors' Services and Standard and Poors, we might well expect there to be actual 
competition rather than monopolistic provision of accreditation services. 
 
Libraries provide another area where services can be more entrepreneurial and responsive to 
client needs if privatised and run on a user-pays basis.  Library firms could engage in 
cooperative interloan arrangements just as they do at present, but one might also expect 
academics in some cases to deal direct (via email and courier services) with distant libraries that 
offer access to superior collections if this enabled them to obtain books and papers more rapidly 
or at less cost than they could if they used local libraries as intermediaries.  One might also 
expect that, as email networks develop, a further source of supply would be direct from authors, 
in the event that enough libraries failed to stock their books or deterred their use via high 
lending charges.  Under a user-pays system, private enterprise libraries would be under market 
pressure to develop their collections in ways that ministered to the preferences of their 
customers: it would be in their interests to ensure that ordering of stock was not the haphazard 
process it tends to be under the common present system of relying on recommendations from 
academic staff, many of whom are too busy to make orders or too inclined to presume that 
someone else will be ordering even if they are not.  Either libraries would employ subject 
librarians who had considerable expertise in their subjects, or they would buy advice in from 
academic consultants or from agencies that specialised in keeping an eye on what was being 
published and how it was being received by reviewers .  
 
6.1.3  Advantage 3:  more efficient use of human resources 
 
With coordination dealt with via individual responses to market conditions or, for a fee, by 
organisers of degree package deals and academic database services, there would be little need 
for academics to spend their time in meetings of the kind often satirised by novelists such as 
Malcolm Bradbury and David Lodge.  Present systems of departmental and faculty board 
meetings are conducted in many universities with little regard for their cost in terms of academic 
time foregone from other uses, or with any consideration for resources eaten up in 
photocopying.  Many staff are present at such meetings merely in order to ensure that the 
numbers will guarantee the fates of particular politically-based proposals or simply to speak 
very briefly on particular issues; much of the time, they have little reason to be there.  Under 
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a market-based system, where academics charge for their time, interchanges between individual 
academics and/or between academics and entrepreneurs specialising in providing coordination 
services will  be avoided unless they concern specific inquiries; committees would be replaced 
by consultancy investigations. 
 
The unbundling of teaching services seems likely to assist in bringing the marginal benefits that 
students derive from the services they consume more into line with the marginal cost of 
providing them.  This is more likely to be a consequence with itemised billing for office 
consultations, since it is easy to monitor who is receiving a private consultation and each 
consultation involves an additional demand on the lecturer's time.  (With large lecture theatres, 
turnstile devices would be needed to monitor attendance and indivisibilities of size mean that 
empty seats could accommodate extra students at no cost to the lecturer.) Here, there are some 
parallells between the problems that arise in the bundled fees approach to charging students and 
those associated with a charge-free health care system a small proportion of whose customers 
are hypochondriacs.  Professionals in both systems end up spending a disproportionate amount 
of their time seeing a few of their clients again and again-clients who in most cases would have 
more fulfilling lives in the long run if they could be eased out of being dependent.  
 
At present, the chief cost to the student of a consultation with a member of staff consists of time 
foregone from the next best alternative activity, including time spent queuing to get to see the 
member of staff.  A further restraining factor may be the feelings of guilt that the student might 
feel from seeing the lecturer too frequently, insofar as this conflicts with expectations about 
what it is reasonable to get from the lecturer rather than achieve by one's own work.  However, 
students-particularly full-fee-paying overseas students-may start feeling less guilty about 
demanding more when increasingly high bundled fees are demanded by universities.  If the 
returns to private study time in a library and/or private thinking about how to answer a question 
are seen as low, there will seem little reason not to call for advice from a lecturer, in the hope 
that the advice will short-cut the need to read or think.  No wonder, then, that students may be 
prepared to sit and wait for the next vacant opportunity to seek advice from lecturers in 
universities that pride themselves in offering an `open door' policy.  Under a bundled fees 
system, the student is not encouraged to think of the lecturers' time as having any opportunity 
cost and is not given a great incentive to try to become more self-reliant and develop vital skills 
in studying and tackling problems.  Such incentives only arise insofar as it proves difficult to get 
to see the lecturer because so many other students 
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are queuing up to do so.  Under such a system it seems likely that the bulk of office 
consultations will be with students with poorly developed study skills since those who can work 
effectively on their own will normally be unwilling to risk having to queue for a long while and 
forego productive study time. 
 
In the absence of a formal system of charging for consultations, lecturers are likely to begin to 
find the open door policy becomes completely unworkable once the staff/student ratio 
deteriorates beyond a particular point.  (With small class sizes the implicit contract over 
reasonable conduct may limit the number of times their students see them on average even 
though queuing is not a problem.)  They will begin to incur so many interruptions to their other 
tasks that in order to avoid burnout they will start imposing prices on the students, whether in 
the form of limited office hour consulting times (to raise queuing costs), consultations by 
appointment only (to impose at least some kind of an upfront administrative hurdle and so that 
they can use long lead times to deter those who seem particularly lacking in self-reliance), or 
simply offering perfunctory rather than consummate assistance (in other words, they give advice 
but with `frown costs' as part of the atmosphere of the transaction).  This outcome is 
understandable in economic terms but is hardly a sign of efficient delivery of educational 
services, particularly if institutions promise more than their staff can deliver by way of personal 
advice.    
    
6.1.4  Advantage 4:  greater choice of work lifestyle 
 
Under a freelancing system academics would have greater scope for piecing together the sorts of 
working lives that most appealed to them.  Academics could control their lives more by 
choosing which individual tasks to sell their labour time to implement, instead of buying into a 
vague contract that might result in them finding more and more tasks put on their desks with 
vacation leave being foregone merely to enable them to keep abreast of the demands of the 
workplace.  Academics who wished to specialise in teaching particular kinds of classes and who 
wish to avoid being involved in administrative matters could do so, by bidding for the kinds of 
subjects they preferred and by using the services of coordination agencies-signing up simply to 
teach with all the hiring of facilities and registration handled by the agencies-and by not selling 
their time on educational consultancies.  Those who wanted to work part-time or teach less and 
spend more time as paid referees, or in chasing research funds, could likewise do so.  So long as 
contracted tasks were done according to contract, recipients of a service would be in no position 
to ask questions about how 
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academics choose to use their time when not engaged providing that service.  
 
6.2 Disadvantages 
  
6.2.1  Possible disadvantage 1:  academics may spend a considerable amount of 
time negotiating contracts 
 
 
This possibility is hard to ignore, given my opening discussion of Coase's analysis of the nature 
of the firm versus the market as a means of coordinating economic activities. However, as we 
think about it we should keep in mind the likely emergence of coordination services competing 
for good academic inputs just like holiday package tour firms need the goodwill of their client 
suppliers of tourism services just as they need the tourist clients who wish to consume them.  
Just as academics who decide that their present university employers run an overly bureaucratic 
or chaotic system can seek to move to better managed institutions, freelance academics could 
experiment with alternative strategies and suppliers if they felt they were spending too much 
time fixing things up for themselves or dealing with poor quality suppliers of coordination and 
other services. 
  
6.2.2  Possible disadvantage 2:  it might be too difficult (or easy) for deviant 
academics to gain accreditation  
 
If professional bodies took a narrow view of what constitutes acceptable or excellent academic 
performances in their disciplinary areas, those academics who failed to fit in with the party line 
could find it difficult to gain approval and hence to win places in academic directories vital for 
marketing themselves to students.  The closed shop tendencies of many professional bodies are 
well-known and are of great concern to those who take a relativistic view of scientific 
knowledge (cf. Feyerabend, 1975).  However, so long as there is a free market for accreditation 
services, then deviants might seek recognition elsewhere.  In economics there are clear signs of 
how deviants do get organised into professional groups that run their own journals, for example, 
the Association for Evolutionary Economics and the Society for the Advancement of 
Socio-Economics.  Probably the real disadvantage of a free market in tertiary education in 
respect of accreditation is not that some academics will experience difficulties in gaining 
recognition but the opposite-that, for a fee, anyone might gain accreditation, just as people can 
buy `degrees' from unrecognised but plausibly named `universities' and rusting hulks can gain 
certificates of seaworthiness from profit-making 
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agencies associated with governments who let their insignia be used as flags of convenience.  In 
the absence of public sector regulation, students might need to be educated at school in ways of 
judging between types of accreditation or might purchase advice from a higher level market or 
public agency that specialises in accrediting accreditation agencies. 
  
6.2.3  Possible disadvantage 3:  short-term contracts may bias the direction of 
research 
 
 
This possibility is related to familiar arguments in favour of university staff being hired on 
contracts that, following a successful probationary period, provide for lifetime employment.  
The `tenure' argument is normally advanced with respect to a need to guarantee academic 
freedom.  However, a further dimension is that those who are on short-term contracts may work 
out research programmes very much with a view to keeping themselves marketable, going for 
projects that will rapidly bear fruit in the form of articles and steering clear of major acts of 
scholarship that have very long gestation periods.  Freelance academics might be able to reduce 
such pressures insofar as they could negotiate, say, five year forward sales of block bookings for 
their services with educational package deal agencies.  The costs of reviewing academics for 
accreditation might also mean that this procedure were undertaken somewhat infrequently, 
unless the academic were seeking to be elevated to a higher level of accreditation.    
  
6.2.4  Possible disadvantage 4:  students may not see merit in spending more than 
the bare minimum on their studies 
 
Students may be inexpert judges of what it is in their best long-term interests to do.  Prior to 
their choices of educational programmes, and subsequently when they are undertaking them, 
they could pay for advice, but they might be suspicious that advice could be coming from those 
who stood to gain from giving particular kinds of advice.  It might be necessary for governments 
to introduce a regulatory framework similar to those used to deal with analogous conflict of 
interest problems in the financial services industry.  Something less than a free market might be 
needed to counter a further problem: unbundled, fee-for service forms of delivery of tertiary 
education involve a greater risk that students might try to get their degrees on the cheap and 
actually end up paying more in the long run because they were too conscious of the costs of 
seeking advice and prone to underestimate the benefits of individual consultations.  A possible 
strategy for dealing with this arises quite simply if 
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students are only partially funding their tertiary studies and are required to purchase study 
vouchers from the government, at a discount.  These could be made student-specific, so that no 
secondary market emerged, and the government could oblige students to purchase a minimum 
number per year of full-time tertiary studies.  It would then be up to the students to decide how 
to use their vouchers and, with their funds sunk into the vouchers at the outset, students would 
be inclined to use them up to the full.  
  
6.2.5  Possible disadvantage 5:  the range of options available to students may 
decline 
 
 
This possibility is related to the one just considered.  At present, subjects with low enrolments 
are cross-subsidised by `service' courses where one academic lectures to several hundred 
students.  With a market based system more attention would be given to the costs and benefits 
of offering unpopular subject units.  Cost-conscious students might be inclined to take cheaper 
units where low prices were achieved on the basis of large enrolments.  An apparent 
consequence would be increasing similarity among patterns of study in particular areas and a 
bias against new units because of their set-up costs.   Two main forces could work against such 
an outcome.  First, costs could be contained by designing teaching methods to economise in 
respect of lecturing to small groups.  Subjects could be based more around guided private 
reading, whilst localised small groups of students in particular subject areas could be 
concentrated together via the use of distance education methods.  Secondly, if the kind of 
voucher-based system discussed in the previous paragraph were introduced, then, in order to 
make the most of their budgets, students might opt to use some of their vouchers to pay for 
studying relatively unpopular subjects, rather than to pay for, say, more intensive tuition as a 
means of achieving higher grades on popular subjects whose basic costs were lower. 
  
6.2.6  Possible disadvantage 6:  a loss of equity for students 
 
A student with a great inclination and ability to invest in a programme of high quality tertiary 
education might opt to spend more than less affluent and less well motivated students.  For 
example, under a freelancing system one would expect tuition from academics involved in 
unfunded research to be more expensive: unless they were prepared to buy research time as a 
luxury by foregoing income below target levels, academics would only be able to engage  
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in unfunded research if they could earn at a higher rate per hour when teaching, for time spent 
doing research is time not available for teaching.  Such higher teaching fees would not be paid 
by students unless they were convinced that their education would be enhanced (or would 
appear to prospective employers to have benefited) by being bestowed by active researchers.  In 
an unbundled system, slow-learning students who needed more consultations with their lecturers 
would, other things equal, be less able to afford an education with research-oriented academics, 
and similarly for less affluent students, unless scholarships were available. 
 
Valid though these claims might be, some other points can be made in opposition to them.  First, 
this analysis does tend to ignore the possibility that academic high-fliers might be the ones most 
prone to want to spend a lot on their education: they might be more likely to see the benefits of 
investing in computing equipment and know-how, paying to be members of classes given by 
renowned and more intellectually demanding scholars, and making voracious use of library 
facilities whilst their less able peers stuck to basic texts.  Secondly, we might note that 
prevailing systems whereby universities charge pretty much the same fees but choose whom to 
admit on the basis of academic records are hardly equitable themselves: if academic high-fliers 
wish to be taught by academics whose teaching loads are low enough to enable them to push 
back the frontiers of knowledge, they tend to find that such academics are very happy to admit 
them in preference to those with less promising records of academic achievement. 
  
6.2.7  Possible disadvantage 7:  loss of `atmosphere' 
 
Following Williamson (1975), New Institutional economists have recognised that the 
productivity of systems of economic organisation are affected by their `atmosphere' and that 
attempts to contrive a particular kind of atmosphere as part of a contractual arrangement may be 
very difficult to engineer.  Even in present systems it is clear that the atmosphere of distance 
learning and commuter universities is different from that at residential universities, and learning 
processes are probably affected by this.  It is doubtful that a decentralised tertiary education 
system in which students bought unbundled packages of educational services would have the 
kind of collegial atmosphere offered by a typical university where most students reside on 
campus.  Consultations with staff, and between staff, would just not be the same if accompanied 
by the sound of a ticking clock against which consulting fees would be calculated.  If students 
were piecing together their educations in all manner of 
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different ways they would be less likely to intermingle and learn outside the classroom on a 
social basis.  Having seen how few of my `commuter students' realise what they may be missing 
in terms of social learning by not being resident on campus, I wonder how far educational 
entrepreneurs would be successful in selling the benefits of franchised package deals that sought 
to enhance the social side of the learning process.  Freelance academics would face much the 
same problems as students with disparate learning programmes.  However, they might be 
expected to attempt to overcome them by investing more in attending conferences and 
participating in local gatherings of professional societies.   
 
7. Conclusion 
 
From the standpoint of the New Institutional Economics a university is seen as a coordinating 
device that signals and upholds academic standards as well as allocating resources.  But it is by 
no means the only conceivable way of achieving these ends.  If a government with a `New 
Right' persuasion closed existing universities, auctioned off their assets and opted out of any 
further involvement in arranging the delivery of higher education, it is by no means obvious the 
forces of free enterprise would select universities-albeit private ones-as the dominant delivery 
system for tertiary teaching and research.  It is quite possible that several systems would prove 
viable in the long run, though it is likely that the transition process would be quite messy unless 
the change to the free market system were signalled well in advance of its implementation-in 
contrast to what has happened in countries such as the UK where almost overnight many new 
universities were created out of former polytechnics.  In New Zealand the Education Minister's 
attempts to foster a `seamless' education system fall a long way short of promoting the extreme 
free market system outlined in this paper.  However, they do recognise that if a variety of 
institutions (schools, polytechnics and universities) have the capacity to offer similar services to 
students then students might benefit from being given more choice in how they put their 
educations together and when they make the move from one institution to another.  Universities 
themselves also appear to be opening their minds about possible ways of delivering educational 
services that increase student choices without compromising standards: they are making 
cross-creditation of subjects much easier; they are increasingly making use of specialist 
consultants or external teaching contractors rather than presuming that, wherever possible, tasks 
should be handled internally by long-term employees; and they are even getting involved in 
franchising activities. 
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It remains unclear how far the extension of the market should go in tertiary education.  Signs of 
institutional failure are certainly not hard to uncover.  Here I will mention just three examples.  
First, private sector personnel managers must be astonished by the way that some universities 
take years to fill vacancies, particularly at a professorial level, or hire manifestly underqualified 
junior staff (particularly in the business area), because senior management are out of touch with 
the realities of the labour market.  Considerable staff time can be eaten up in these processes.  
Secondly, in the United Kingdom, the tendency of `new universities' to award chairs to senior 
staff with research records nowhere near to those typical in established universities has caused 
much disquiet-for example, the Times Higher Education Supplement, 18 March 1994, reported 
that Dr Phil O'Keefe of the new University of Northumbria resigned his chair in protest in his 
own inaugural lecture.  Parallel but less dramatic grumbling was heard in Australia a few years 
earlier as the binary divide there came to an end.  Thirdly, as someone originally trained in the 
United Kingdom, I have been horrified over the past decade to observe a lack of double marking 
and external examining of undergraduates in Australasia.  This means that lecturers who believe 
that degrees are being awarded in too slack a manner can appeal to no external reference point if 
trying to uphold their raw marks against empire-building heads of department who would prefer 
to cook the marks into something more palatable to those who allocate resources between 
departments and institutions. 
 
On the other hand, universities can be portrayed as remarkably effective devices for 
economising on the costs of using markets by offering flexible bundled products called degree 
or diploma programmes and hiring staff on exceedingly vague contracts.  Academic 
professionalism and dedication have enabled many universities to function on the basis of much 
give and take with much smaller management structures than private firms with comparable 
numbers of employees.  By not making many things the subject of fresh contracts they have 
sidestepped the problem that, if items have to be charged for on an individual basis, the number 
of things that can be purchased may be reduced by the consumption of resources in the 
contracting and billing process.  It is conceivable that opportunistic behaviour may be far less in 
universities than in the world of business.  Thus in many cases academic integrity may have 
been sufficient to stop standards from being compromised despite minimal formal monitoring 
and auditing of performance.  
 
Insofar as the delivery of tertiary education is indeed based on professional expertise and 
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non-opportunistic conduct, it may be unfortunate that education ministers are, via their demands 
for greater accountability, leading to growth in corporate-style management with expensive new 
senior appointments and demands that staff fill out audit forms in triplicate.  Such costs of 
management could be a major drain on resources that might have been used for teaching and 
research, for little or no gain in operating efficiency.  It is paradoxical that government demands 
for accountability are increasing at the same time as governments are trying to facilitate 
competition in the delivery of higher education.  If competition between alternative delivery 
modes is intense, it will be in the long-run interests of those who provide educational services to 
take their own steps to ensure they are not squandering their resources and that they can 
convince potential customers of the quality of their products.  
  
26 
 
 
 
 References 
 
Arrow, K.J. (1962) Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention, in The Rate 
and Direction of Inventive Activity, National Bureau of Economic Research, Princeton, 
NJ, Princeton University Press. 
 
Coase, R.H. (1937) `The nature of the firm', Economica, 4 (new series), pp. 386-405.  
 
Dnes, A.W. (1992) Franchising: A Case Study Approach, Aldershot, Avebury. 
 
Douglas, R. (1993) Unfinished Business, Auckland, Random House. 
 
Feyerabend, P.K. (1975) Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, 
London, New Left Books. 
 
Hirschman, A.O. (1970) Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. 
 
Hodgson, G. (1988) Economics and Institutions, Oxford, Polity Press. 
 
Kay, J.A. (1993) Foundations of Corporate Success, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Richardson, G.B. (1960) Information and Investment, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Williamson, O.E. (1975) Markets and Hierarchies, New York, Free Press. 
 
Williamson, O.E. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York, Free Press. 
 
27 
 
 
 
 Discussion 
 
This paper was intended to be provocative, not least of all because it was delivered only a few 
days after the publication of the report of the Todd Taskforce on the funding of tertiary 
education in New Zealand.  In this sense, at least, it succeeded and a flavour of the kinds of 
discussions it provoked around Lincoln University may be gained from the following pair of 
responses that the author received on email (Earlp@Lincoln.ac.nz) the day after the lecture was 
delivered. 
 
(a)  From: Bill Rosenberg, Systems Manager, Centre for Computing and Biometrics, 
Lincoln University 
 
Peter, 
 
I was interested in the subject of your inaugural address - it is very  current, with the Todd 
Report and so on.  Option B of the Todd Report gives an analysis with logic similar to the one 
you gave, but of course not quite to the same extreme of market anarchy, and not much 
discussion of the disadvantages.  What I think is the interesting matter in all this is not that one 
can nominally treat education like any other commodity in the market - that's been done all too 
often! - but what makes education different from other `products' to make the analysis wrong, 
which I believe it is. 
 
 Some examples:  
 
*  It is not clear who the `customer' is: parent, student, employer, society at large, or the 
next teacher you hand a student on to! 
*  Education modifies the student `customer' in a number of quite subtle ways, including 
effects that are not controllable by either party.   
*  The `quality' of the `output' (it's not clear how to measure either of these) depends as 
much on the student (part-input and part-customer) as on the teacher. 
*  The fact that it is a social process, and the process is as important - in University 
education, perhaps more important - than the `output'. 
*  The long-term nature of the process; and the possibility that its length may conflict with 
the student `customers' ' preference for quick `service'. 
*  The important but ill-defined relationship between individual disciplines (`education 
products') needed for a `rounded' education. 
*  The very high stakes for the student if failure occurs, and for society  (due to high public 
benefits) if failure of the process occurs. 
 
Those only look at the student-teacher or student-University relationship.  They're extremely 
important because otherwise I think we end up going down the road that the Todd Committee 
leads us, which I think would be disastrous.  The close inter-relationship between research and 
University teaching adds further interesting complexity. 
 
I certainly think it is essential to evaluate the effects of an open market in education with 
considerations such as I raised.  Describing an open market scenario without such caveats is 
only too likely to be taken as a serious prescription by some of the more shallow thinkers that 
seem to pop up depressingly often amongst our policy makers! 
 
Any thoughts? Bill. 
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(b)  From Stan Godlovitch, Lecturer in Philosophy, Department of Landscape    
  Architecture, Lincoln University 
 
Peter, 
 
I attended your Inaugural Lecture on universities, enjoyed it, and, wanting a discussion session 
afterwards, thought I'd compensate by turning to the screen machine to record a few thoughts 
which may or may not be pertinent.  Some are quasi-empirical, some are quasi-conceptual.  
 
(a)  You talked about the contrast between United Kingdom and New Zealand/Australian 
universities vis-a-vis external marking.  I taught at Bedford College London for a couple 
of years.  We didn't send our finals out.  Things may have changed, but somehow I 
doubt it.  I also suspect, but may be wrong, that many if not most of the new Thatcherite 
instant universities don't send too much out, because they'd overwhelm the system.  As 
for New Zealand, I can tell you with confidence that Auckland Philosophy has for years 
had a reciprocal relation with Wellington Philosophy to cross-check senior and graduate 
papers.  I think the cross-check convention is likely a matter of departmental convention 
and may even be discipline-specific.  Some disciplines have built-in a fear of bias, 
usually positive bias, which the anonymity of cross-checking is designed to minimize.  
So far as I know, no North American institutions cross-check.  This hasn't so far as I can 
judge in Philosophy led to degradation of quality at the good schools.  They make their 
Firsts so hard to get to ensure that, at least in that arena, their reputations are maintained.  
Because good schools don't trust weaker ones [word gets around fast], they re-create in 
the graduate course requirements the standards they maintain in their own undergraduate 
degrees and weed out there.  The oddity in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New 
Zealand is that they consider postgraduate degrees on thesis alone thus possibly naively 
putting too much faith in the consistency at the undergrdauate level. 
 
(b)  North American schools have increasingly relied on part-time and specialist instruction.  
This is the rule in medicine, law, engineering-all the areas where current street-savvy is 
crucial to ensuring up-to-date and practised instruction.  On the free market side, the 
place I worked for in Canada until recently-not atypical-often ran with up to 40 per cent 
so-called sessional piece-work course-by-course instruction contracted out to what is 
becoming a semi-permanent workforce of part-time instructors.  The idea is to ensure 
`flexibility'; i.e., when the demand for discipline D drops, you don't have to keep on a 
crew of expensive tenured instructors in D but can rapidly shift your payroll to the hot 
new demand of the day.  It is perhaps cost-effective in some ways but pedagogically 
risky in others.  Part-timers have no attachment to the institution [they're mercilessly 
exploited financially] and, because they're so often worrying about where the next 
bit-part job will come up, not able to maintain currency in their fields as can permanent 
secure people because their whole livelihood depends on this kind of gypsy work 
[unlike specialists brought in part-time who often do it for as a service to the profession 
or just for fun]. 
 
(c)  Your model of free-lancers in the open market instantly reminded me of itinerant 
Athenian teachers so well characterized [and ridiculed] by Plato [who opened his own 
private school].  Teaching started life in the mode you describe.  Once education was 
invented, itinerant teaching could no longer compete.  The issue requires an historical 
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 analysis, not an economic one.  There's a reason why shop-front teaching in certain 
areas-not all-became increasingly concentrated into centres.  I think it has to do 
fundamentally with conceptions of the integrity of learning which cannot be well served 
by the rented office model.  I also suspect that the rise of centres of learning had much 
less to do with efficiency-an over-loaded normative term-than it had to do with the need 
for instructional comprehensiveness.  Maybe this is another facet of efficiency.  At any 
rate, comprehensiveness is a victim in the free-market model.  The universities as 
traditionally evolved worked first to ensure that and may indeed, but incidentally, have 
sacrificed other aspects of efficiency along the way.  But what counts as efficiency 
depends entirely on where you're trying to go. 
 
(d)  I'd hoped in your talk that you'd have pressed further those few areas of tuition where 
individuals predominate rather than institutions.  [I must say that I've never been 
convinced about the use of `product' when applied to tuition as synonymous with 
`product' as applied to baked beans.  There is an analogy perhaps but many disanalogies, 
as many if not more than there are in talking about water `flow' and electricity `flow' and 
traffic `flow'.  Much market talk is born out of mistaking a common metaphor for a 
common process.  But this, for you, is just a platitude, I'm sure.] If one examines where 
individual tuition has survived, the private music lesson or private tennis lesson is surely 
significant.  [Note, that even such private music tuition often verges on the creation of 
centres-conservatories, guitar shops offering complimentary lessons, etc.-and these tend, 
like the supermarket, to kill off the corner store if North American marketing is anything 
to go by.] What distinguishes such private tuition and, I reckon, makes it viable is 
precisely its predominantly recreational nature; viz., nothing serious hangs on it from the 
point of view of the pupil's future livelihood.  Furthermore, when the tuition isn't 
recreationally oriented, it's largely directed at the very young and usually forms part of a 
parent's plan for complimenting conventional institutional education.  It is highly 
dubious, given the historical fact of institutional concentration, that, were typical 
institutions to divest themselves [contrary to their historical development] of various 
offerings that a private market would arise to fill the gap.  This, I think, has to do with 
the vastly different functions of institutional vs individual instruction sectors.  The long 
and short of this is that it's just not at all clear, given historical developments, that the 
private model could in fact substitute for the institutional model.  All it can do, if that, is 
fill a few gaps.  My money would be on the university that started giving tennis lessons 
as likely to drive out the `little guy'.  Why?  Because if you're big, you can provide just 
the choice, range, facilities for, quality of instruction which is most attractive.  Note, 
again as a personal observation, if you get very good at whatever you learned privately, 
the encouragement is to learn publicly, institutionally, because you'll get more varied 
instruction and also face internal `competition' which drives many learners much harder 
than efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and the rest.  [Odd that you didn't point out that 
competition among students is exceedingly difficult to re-create in the individual 
learning market.  That, surely, is one of the principal virtues of collective learning.] 
 
(e)  I don't recall that you made much mention in your talk about education as such.  I know 
this is perhaps a Romantic throwback, but the bittiness of learning you canvassed falls 
far short of at least one function universities have done and can do probably better than 
any entrepreneurial individualism.  The system of which you spoke made it sound as if 
clients would somehow figure out that they didn't really know sweet-tweet about a given 
discipline unless they went to all the right 
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marketeers.  But any given marketer or marketer's marketer [your agencies] is not prima 
facie likely to direct the client to competitor's shopfronts.  I want to study philosophy.  I 
go to the metaphysician.  Why should I go to the moral philosopher, the epistemologist, 
the philosopher of science, the aesthetician?  The metaphysician isn't likely to tell me-
unless he's awfully broad-minded-that I've had enough of his service and should really 
go off to someone else, unless they're in league.  But if they're in league, all this will do 
is just re-create in an almost grotesque way the comprehensive coverage that comes as a 
functional imperative of the university department.  You're back to what you need 
through an incredibly roundabout and unreliable mechanism.  I suppose you did use as 
your focus such professions as law and accounting which regulate their membership 
[often, alas, protect their membership from proper external scrutiny and so perpetuate 
bad practice by denying its existence except every now and then when they agree to 
sacrifice some fall guy to restore public `confidence'], but this regulation optimally 
preserves the integrity of the services the profession sells.  Philosophers don't sell 
services, nor do historians, literary critics, scholars of the Italian Renaissance, nor indeed 
do pure mathematicians, theoretical physicists, etc.  Without a service to sell, if these 
areas would survive at all, there would be absolutely no ground whatsoever to 
`safeguard standards'.  Now, one can say and even perhaps argue that such non-service 
areas are precisely the ones which ought to be expunged.  Maybe so, but the grounds 
cannot be efficiency- there's no way of making philosophy efficient like that.  It can only 
be that the free-market model also carries with it the conviction that learning proper, 
education as such, is necessarily that which can aspire to standards of cost-effectiveness 
and quality control optimally ensured by the best of Law Societies or Professional 
Regulatory Bodies.  This, of course, is precisely the question at issue, and is surely just 
begged by the mere supposition that the free-market model can somehow cover for and 
functionally re-create whatever institutional learning offers. 
 
(f)  There was much you left unstated and understated in your `loss of "atmosphere"' 
consideration.  I was waiting for it and was glad it came at the end.  I don't know about 
you but, I learned as much from the clever people I hung out with as I did from my 
instructors, sometimes more.  I was studying philosophy pretty intensively.  What I 
learned to appreciate about sociology, anthropology, political science, economics, 
biology, and physics was almost entirely due to my friendships with people in those 
areas.  I'd be a greater ignoramus than I now am without such associations.  So would 
we all.  The model you proposed as a functional alternative to universities-well, good 
universities-isn't functionally equivalent at all.  It just shows that, under certain 
conditions, certain kinds of specialized training may be achieved without the huge 
clumsy operations we now endure.  I don't think this is controversial.  Indeed, some 
people, very traditional people, think it a huge mistake that universities took on 
instruction in accounting, engineering, nursing, etc., rather than leaving these to the 
traditional apprenticeships [why were these not raised in your considerations?] which 
did the straight-and-narrow job pretty damn well.  The traditional response is that 
university-trained engineers have at least the chance to become educated people, even if 
this ideal exists more often in fantasy than not. 
 
(g)  Not once did you mention that the universities are thought to be vital repositories of our 
cultural past and sanctuaries for concentrated criticism of our cultural present and 
proposed future.  Can one reasonably suppose that these functions would or even could 
be retained in the rented-office model?  It wouldn't be in the economic interests of any 
instructor to fly these flags, certainly not gratuitously. 
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All of this points, I guess, to the multiple disanalogies with the very market model which just 
cannot address, make room for, a number of very ordinary goals and functions of higher 
education.  The real question is:  should there be higher education as has evolved historically? 
The answer to that, unfortunately, cannot be grounded in considerations of market efficiencies.  
Indeed, it is only when the values embedded in market efficiencies are already pre-supposed that 
the question makes sense at all. 
 
There were some further thoughts I had particularly about contractual vagueness which 
concerned me.  Here they are: 
 
(h)  The entrepreneurial model proposed seems perfectly consistent with an identical kind of 
vagueness typical of the firm model.  Consider this contractual interchange as one seeks 
private music lessons: 
 
 `Customer': "Teach me guitar." 
 Teacher: "OK, just do as I say and you'll be on your way." 
 
 That constitutes a service contract.  Talk about vague.  There is no necessary degree of 
specificity in job descriptions of most sorts.  These can easily be confused for the 
specificity, where it exists, of task descriptions, particular exercises of expertise; [e.g. 
`Today, I shall lecture on the extinctions of the Late Permian, their possible causes and 
consequences...'] 
 
(i)  It occurred to me that the difference between vagueness and definiteness-such as it is- 
might be cast in terms of the difference between Common versus Statute Law.  Your 
comment about how vague your job description is can be answered by saying that its 
obligations are set by precedent [Common Law] not by precise prescription [Statute 
Law] and so your duties are simply assumed as per common law notions of `reasonable 
expectation'; e.g. giving an inaugural lecture.  Again, the historical dimension is critical. 
 
 All this notwithstanding, even Statute Law and highly prescribed contracts are always 
subject to interpretation.  This is true of all contracts because, given the nature of 
language, there is an unavoidable factor of equivocity.  For example, it is consistent with 
your contract to interpret it all as ironic rather than literal however maverick this may be.  
Courts would have to deal with that one. 
 
 At best, I'm inclined to suppose that there may be relative degrees of vagueness and 
definiteness.  The terms `vague' and `definite' [or `precise' or `determinate'] are scalar 
concepts, not polar ones. 
 
(j)  Linked to (h), a huge number of private sector individual-operator non-tuitional tasks 
are contractually vague given the assigned tasks.  Consider: 
 
 TRADES:   Fix my car/toilet/patio. 
 PROFESSIONS:  Draw up a will/plan for a garden/Make me well. 
 SPORTS:   Play right wing. 
 
 Again, what we do in the end [results] may be relatively definite in some sense but how 
it is done [manner] can never be specified because that will vary with contingencies. 
32 
 
 
 
A last unrelated point.  I thought about your passing case where an academic says `I'm working 
at home' and may be doing something incidental to the task at hand.  Surely, it's equally fair 
game to point the same finger at: `I'm off to a conference', `I'm having a working lunch', `I'm off 
on a business retreat', etc.  I know quite a few people in the oilpatch in Calgary, `efficient' 
leaders of a very big business.  Their junkets, golfgames, lunches, business meetings, etc., make 
any academic seem roaringly `efficient' in the contrast wherever they park their hat.  That's 
because academics tend not to squander the way people in big business and executive branches 
of government squander.  They've just not got the means.  Academics in that sense are infinitely 
less likely of being simply corrupt than those in the private sector and those in Big Government 
or Big Labour.  The tragedy, as always, is that when business and government wish to appear 
accountable to the shareholder or public, they lay off the most vulnerable employees while 
giving themselves bonuses for losing less money than the year before.  In the contrast, 
academics are incredibly innocent and even hard-working by nature.  I can tell you tales of 
typical oilpatch `hard work' which tend to bring out the oiliness and not the shine in a 
supposedly Lean-and-Mean industry.  In the end, I reckon the society, particularly this society, 
gets incredibly good value for its universities if that's the benchmark. 
 
Cheers, Stan.   
 
